The Current State of U.S.-Taiwan Security Relations (May 22nd Event)
Thursday, May 22, 2014 10 am to 12 pm
Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C. Headquarters1015 15th Street, N.W., 6th Floor Washington, DC
Seth Cropsey (Moderator) • Director of the Center for American Seapower, Hudson Institute
塞斯·克羅波西 • 哈德森研究所 美國海上力量中心主任
Dr. Michael Pillsbury (Panelist) • Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
白瑞邦博士 • 哈德森研究所 資深研究員
Mark Stokes (Panelist) • Executive Director, Project 2049 Institute
馬克·斯托克斯 • 2049項目研究所 執行主任
Michael Auslin (Panelist) • Columnist, Wall Street Journal; Senior Fellow and Director of Japan Studies, American Enterprise Institute
米沙·奧斯林 • 華爾街日報 專欄作家 • 美國企業研究所 資深研究員和日本研究主任
Good morning! Welcome to Hudson Institute. I am Seth Cropsey, Senior Fellow here and Director of Hudson’s relatively new Center for American Seapower. Thanks for joining us this morning.
This discussion comes at a propitious, or I should say, regrettably propitious time. China’s plan to situate a billion dollar oil rig off the Vietnam coast has turned into a crisis in the South China Sea. The implications for the entire region are troublesome far beyond Beijing’s placement of the drilling rigs inside Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone.
The act resulted in multiple run-ins between military and civilian ships in both countries, I think you know that. It produced riots in Vietnam which resulted in the death of two Chinese workers. It induced Beijing to evacuate thousands of Chinese nationals by air, and some by sea, and most important, I think, the incident is a reminder of Chinese miscalculations and a response that Beijing clearly did not anticipate.
(1:15) Look, with the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand 100 years ago next month, that, in order to be clear, and not predicting that the oil rig dispute is going to lead to world war—I don’t think that’s true. I am saying, that the incident is a common phenomenon, where relations between states are text. Leaders make mistakes; events don’t go as they expected. In a huge region, where the tensions between Vietnam and China are reproduced with most neighboring states, that are either islands or have large coast lines, the potential for other mistakes is large. And nowhere is this more true than in the narrow strait that divides Taiwan from the PRC, which continues each year to in-mass an arsenal of missiles on the mainland.
(2:22) Although commerce between Taiwan and the PRC continues to increase, the former is a democracy, the latter is a one-party ruled authoritarian state. Democratic behavior is often harder to predict, and that of states ruled by autocrats, whose enduring interest is, above all, the preservation of their own power and of their ruling party.
(2:50) So this is a prescription for the interesting times that most of us would like to avoid living in. It’s also an important reason for the 35 year-old Act of the Congress, which provides that the U.S. will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such a quantity, as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. Congress reaffirmed this Act most recently last year, notwithstanding the US’s thus far failed material need to assist Taiwan in its longstanding and legitimate effort to protect itself from the threat of blockade by PRC submarines and surface ships.
(3:38) So this morning’s conference will look at U.S.-Taiwan’s security relationship, concentrating in particular, on the ability of the U.S. to live up to its commitments, the threats in the region, and the overall state of the security in the relationship between Washington and Taipei. And here to shed some light on that, we are fortunate to have, in order of their speaking, which has been determined by where I found their nameplates this morning: Michael Pillsbury, who’s a Senior Fellow here at Hudson, whose thoughtful originality I trust, a future government of the United States will again turn to. Michael served as Assistant Under Secretary of Defense Policy Planning Office in the Reagan Administration and was the special assistant for Asian Affairs in the office of the Secretary of Defense in the first Bush’s administration.
(4:44) Mark Stokes, next, the Executive Director for Project 2049 Institute, a 20-year US Air Force veteran. Mark previously served as team chief and senior country director for the PRC and Taiwan and Mongolia, and in the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. His experience alone places him in the first rank in America’s most distinguished agency there is. And Misha Auslan is the Director of Japan Studies of the American Enterprise Institute. He’s a columnist for the Wall Street Journal. His writings on Asia and global security are indispensible for anyone who wants to understand the region and American interests in it. I’ve said enough this morning, so let me turn it over to Michael.
Thank you, Seth. (Do you want the podium or the…) I think given the formality of the Hudson Institute should be from the team, if it’s okay with you. (That’s okay).
謝謝，賽斯。 （你想在講台或......）我想由於哈德遜研究所的正式性，應該是團隊一起，如果你不介意的話。 （沒關係）。
(5:58) There’s been a debate over the last couple of years about what is the role of think tanks in Washington D.C. One point of view is advocacy; think tanks are our advocacy. They take money from sponsors, sponsors already have an agenda, an idea of what they want to do; and the think tank are scholars just fill out more ammunition, if you will, for the advocacy that is already determined.
The other side of the story, the one that I am closer to, is that the think tanks can play a role in keeping debates alive, that the sides of the debate over the last, in this case, I’m going to talk about the last 30 years or so, the sides have a stake in how the next generation learns what happened, and why it happened, especially if the debates are very close in the outcome.
The winning side has a stake and say, “we won fair and square, there was no real opposition, and besides, they’re all dead.” The think tank can say, actually, there was this debate, or there were many debates, here’s what the issues were; it was a close call, and now that 20 or 30 years have gone by, perhaps the wrong side won.
And so, you, the next generation people, should be aware of what that debate was about, because it might come around again. So I thought that today I would rehearse for you some of the debates that have taken place about Taiwan’s securities, and I am going to indicate the winners and the losers. At the [same] time, I’ll leave it to you, and to Mark Stokes and Misha Auslan, to talk about whether or not the debates need to be revisited. In fact, crisis events may cause it to be revisited.
(7:51) The first issue, in all of the debates and in all facts, they are not usually opinions. People don’t say, “I love Taiwan, you hate Taiwan.” You never get that kind in a debate. It’s over facts. First big debate was very striking. It happened in 1949. It was whether or not Taiwan had any strategic military value to United States.
And the Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote a memo, saying the answer is “no”. And the Secretary of State made an announcement, the President agreed, “We will not defend Taiwan. If Beijing wanted to take it by force, we will not defend them.” That became the first fact, and the issue of Taiwan’s value, in a strategic sense, to United States: the answer is “no”.
Then, the Chinese military was ordered by Chairman Mao to start an invasion, which they did; it failed. And one of President Xi Jinping’s closest military advisers of the day, who became famous about 10 years ago, his name is General Liu Yazhou, wrote an article, a blockbuster of an article, and, about 2005, saying, the reason we failed in 1949 and 1950, was we were inadequately prepared, we underestimated Taiwan’s military forces, and he gave a very detailed account of attacking before you’re prepared, and how the PLA must never do this again, even if ordered by the civilians to attack.
(9:34) The second big fact that was debated at the time, ran throughout the 50’s. Shall we put American nuclear weapons on Taiwan or not? Some said, “no”. The winners were those who said “yes”. American nuclear weapons should go to Taiwan, and be kept at CC Air Force Base, with jet fighters that [were] delivered [to] them against various targets on the mainland. The Chinese know all about this; they write about it; they didn’t discuss the two crises.
And early in the third debate, took place in 1954, “Shall we have a security treaty with Taiwan?” Some said no, this would provoke China; it’s unnecessary; Taiwan’s strategic value is very limited. They lost. The President and the Senate approved the security treaty with Taiwan, and this caused two important things to happen, that are still with us again, in 2014.
A General, sometimes an Admiral, because seapower is very important, was established in Taiwan with a very large war-planning and war-fighting team; it’s called the Taiwan Defense Command. So Taiwan’s military and ours was integrated into the entire U.S. Defense Department and the Pacific Command. We did exercises together. According to a number of articles, we had joint war plans, at one point, Colonel Stokes did the amazing, historical detective work and found out the mean of the war plan. No, I’m not gonna say it.
And there started a period, where Taiwan and the United States had a normal, defense security relationship. And that meant a second General, an American General had an office and a team (11:43) in Taiwan. He was the head of the military assistance command, and he and his large team worked with the Taiwan military to decide what kind of jet fighters, what kind of ships, what kinds of equipment should Taiwan buy, or be given, by the United States. Now Beijing noticed this. So fast forwarding to the talks that went on in the 70’s (12:07), or recognition of United States by China.
One of the things that China insisted on: these two offices must be closed. Not just the U.S. Embassy must be closed, not just official ties; these two offices, these two Generals and their teams that are integrating Taiwan’s military into the American national defense system must be withdrawn. Nobody can be there, no uniforms, and ideally, they would like the two structures, two buildings destroyed. President Carter did this; future President George Bush criticized him on Christmas Eve, 1979, very famous Washington Post op-ed piece. Father George H.W. Bush said, I disapprove of what Jimmy Carter has done, he could have had the same deal, it was a bad deal many years ago. And a couple of days later, the State Department of China Desk Director also went off the op-ed piece, saying this is a bad deal.
(13:17) So the debate shifted then, to, are the terms of the agreement of the U.S.-China diplomatic recognition, to everybody in America almost agrees as a wonderful diplomatic recognition, you have to recognize reality. But, the narrow, detailed terms of how Taiwan would be treated were not revealed by either the U.S. Government, or the Taiwan Government, or Beijing. And a very interesting thing happened: a Senator named Gordon Humphrey and the Executive Director of the Heritage Foundation, Ed Feulner, flew to Taiwan, and they said there is going to be a Taiwan Relations Act draft.
It doesn’t mention military security, doesn’t mention sales of armed forces equipment, doesn’t mention preparation for crisis; all the things that we know in the Taiwan Relations Act were ultimately passed, were not in that first draft from President Carter’s White House. So the idea of Heritage’s first director and Senator Humphrey and the delegation that went, was to get Taiwan’s government to say something about “we oppose this diplomatic recognition agreement and the terms that are in it”. Taiwan said no. And Ed Feulner gave, and on the record, [an] angry press conference, with the immortal two sentences, still with us today: “We Americans can’t be more Catholic than the Pope”, which is hard to translate into Chinese, I am not sure people in Taiwan understood this, and, “We can’t demand a full loaf, if Taiwan’s government’s gonna settle for half a loaf”.
So, in the Taiwan Relations Act debate, there were a number of amendments proposed, that had to do with better terms in the treatment of Taiwan. They all failed; they failed by a few votes in the Senate. Taiwan’s government had said, don’t do this, we will not support these stronger steps in the Taiwan Relations Act to protect our security.
(15:32) If you fast forward to the testimony…let me go back for a few seconds to the military value of Taiwan. In the testimony for the Taiwan Relations Act, the American Admiral who had been the head of the Taiwan Defense Command that I had mentioned to you testified, he was asked, do we have, do we think there was any military value to Taiwan? And Admiral Ed Snyder said, in public, “Yes, Sir! I believe Taiwan is equal to 10 aircraft carriers!” Ten aircraft carriers!
(16:08) Another witness was then, American professor at Penn State, now he was more famous in Taiwan as a member, former member of the parliament, Parris Chang. He was asked, “do you think there should be American preparations in our Taiwan Relations Act, [which] should mention crisis diplomacy, enable to stop a boycott, being able to stop an embargo”, it’s a kind of plaintive question. Parris Chang said, yes, I do. That was put into the Act.
So the Congress toughened the Taiwan Relations Act, but not as much as what the American military officers were testifying. Then the Carter Administration asked Michael Armacost, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Defense for East Asia and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “What about this military value of Taiwan issue?” And they said no; they said there is no strategic value to Taiwan. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, David Jones, wrote a letter saying that, which is part of the record. The testimony of Michael Armacost says the main threat to Asia today is to Soviet Union, and Taiwan is of no value, and that threads the scenario (?).
So now, if you are following my idea of the think tank, that think tanks keep alive debates, debates are sometimes over facts; facts can be (17:30 in audio; 18:02 in video) in dispute, and then they can be suppressed later. When we fast forward to just a few years ago, Ray Burghardt gave a press conference, and said he had never heard, he was asked, these talks about Ma Ying-Jeou and the mainland, could they go too far? Are you Americans concerned about the loss of Taiwan to the mainland? And Ray Burghardt said, AIT put it up on their public website. He said something like, in my entire career in the U.S. government for 30 years, I have never heard of the idea of Taiwan as an unsinkable aircraft carrier, or have any military strategic value to the United States.
(18:10) So, when we come to today, Seth, this basic debate continues: does Taiwan’s military connection, if you want to call it that, for lack of a better term, with the United States, does it matter to us or not? Is this something we do because people in Taiwan wanna buy weapons or because some pressure from the Taiwan Relations Act? I submit that that debate is still going on. The second big debate, this is the only one I am trying to cover, in a matter of a couple remaining minutes, the second biggest debate that has been going on, again, goes back to 1949, it’s over the intentions and capabilities of China.
(19:02) And, generally speaking, the winning side has said, China faces grave internal economic and other problems. China can never, it’s inconceivable, that China can pull even with the United States or surpass it, in terms of overall economic power. That cannot happen. Number two, the youth in China and many moderates, believe deeply in democracy. They translate the works of James Madison, there was advocacy in the 80’s of balance of power and national election system, and these forces, as long as we don’t disturb them, …they are inevitably going to turn China into, …possibly America’s best friend in history. A second England, a special relationship, a sort of a quasi ally, and therefore, there is a third part to this line of thinking.
Therefore, what should we do? Not only not provoke China, about nationalistic matters, like Taiwan, we should also help China. We should accept their exports, we should establish over 100 scientific exchange agreements in which we provide, for free, the results of American scientific findings, we should open an office of our National Science Foundation in Beijing, because China made clear very early in ’78, that what they wanted most from us, was science and technology, number one; number two, investment, which has been an enormous—more than 20 times in China than in India for the last 25 years.
So that was the three part set of, almost factual assumptions. And they are not going to amount to anything. Now, the Financial Times, two weeks ago, covered a story: World Bank new data says that China, this year, will surpass the United States, in economic strength measured in the so-called purchasing power parity. China denies this; China says, no, we can’t; it’s not true. Official World Bank study on the front page of the Financial Times. Number two, yes, there are forces for democracy in China; they must be in there somewhere. Every time we have a new leader, there are scholars that write op-eds, this is it; this man is going to reform this place, have elections, multiple parties. So, I’m sure that they are right, but it could be 100 years.
(21:47) This debate affects decisions at the presidential level about arms sales to Taiwan. So, the last debate, I am going to mention very briefly was, … in the Clinton administration, and I am afraid Lt. Colonel Stokes was involved deeply in this, Kurt Campbell was the Deputy Assistant Secretary [of Defense], I made a speech on it, which was cleared by the Secretary of Defense to be made public, apparently the Clinton administration had a secret program after the two carrier crisis in ’96, to begin direct ties with the Taiwan military, under the slogan “software not hardware”. And talks began in the California seaside fishing town called Monterey, and in the speech that was approved by the DOD, I list all the things that Mark Stokes, Randy Schriver, Kurt Campbell successfully did. When the Bush administration came in, Secretary Rumsfeld was pleasantly surprised by all this, and he continued, and expanded it.
(22:54) Now, those who have been worried about provoking China, setting back our relationship, they got the idea that this contact with Taiwan’s military, immediate advice to them, what kind of weapon systems they should buy, what kind of training, even setting up an office of net assessment in the Taiwan Defense Ministry, and strategic planning office, having civilians be appointed for continuity, all of this advice began with President Clinton, according to the critics, was restoring the U.S.-China security treaty relationship, thereby betraying the agreements that Jimmy Carter had made, and this was happening when Taiwan’s president was seeking to stopover or visit people in Washington. So, to the Chinese, it appeared to be a part of a conspiracy; the Americans were betraying the arrangements that they had successfully made with Jimmy Carter. (24:00) So, I would say, this part of the debate prevailed. Their case was successful. They said these kinds of activities have to be so very limited.
And in 2004, an American Defense Department official testified to the Congress that he hoped, for Taiwan security to be improved, there were two things, actually three things, he hoped would be done, this was 10 years ago. Number one, Taiwan’s military services would be inter-operable with each other, which they weren’t. Number two, Taiwan’s military services would become inter-operable with United States military, which they weren’t. Number three, that other Asian nations, unnamed, would become inter-operable also with Taiwan’s military forces. So that’s where the debate was, the DOD official told the Congress, I wish these three things would happen. The other side, the winning side, says no, this is the way to provoke Beijing and turn them into an enemy forever, thereby setting back those forces of democracy.
So these debates, I maintain, are still with us today. … I heard that the Deputy Secretary of State speak last night, used an interesting adjective about China,…. He’s a man of peace, he’s been in charge of Iranian secret talks, he’s a current foreign service officer, and people who had his position in the past have spoken in an extremely positive way about China: cooperation, responsible stake holder, there’s a number of these expressions that have been used by the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of State over the years.
Last night, Deputy Secretary [of State] Burns called China “pugnacious”. Well, folks, I often wince on how to translate things into Mandarin, that will be meaningful to you, but I’m afraid it comes to close to 侵略性 , which means aggressive, in the sense of Adolf Hitler’s侵略性. This is not friendly. So I maintain that the role of think tanks in Washington, D.C., and we here at Hudson are, I think, are doing this, we want to study, and I, myself am writing a study that is now so-called the hidden history of U.S.-China-Taiwan relations, what actually happened. Many documents are still classified; I have requested to the various presidential libraries; others are working on this as well. But the younger generation, I think, should not assume that they know the whole story of U.S.-China relations.
Why did father Bush, President H.W. Bush attack Jimmy Carter, Christmas Eve, 1979? What is Taiwan’s strategic value? What does China think about all this? What do they relate to us? And they have conveyed one message very consistently; two generals have written about it. They said China’s core interest in Taiwan is not all of Taiwan; it’s not Taiwan’s businessmen, it’s not hurting Taiwan somehow; it’s only one thing: the Taiwan independent’s forces. They used the words “independent’s forces” to say this is the cause of war. We will use force if Taiwan’s independent’s forces prevail. So, the debate that I don’t have time to go in to, Seth, is what exactly are the Taiwan independent’s forces, that Beijing has been warning now, for more than 10 years that are the cause of war, if they succeed? Thank you. (27:55)
Michael, before we proceed, … in your historical research or review, how far back, when is the first, in U.S. expression, of what you would regard as, true American…strategic interest to Taiwan? How far back do you go to to find a coherent, articulate, sensible statement of American strategic interest?
Well, there are two moments. One is our interest in Taiwan island itself, as a piece of real estate, I might say, and that’s about 1943, when the bombing of Taiwan by the United States was seen as part of the effort to embargo, to choke off Japan, and be the success of World War II. Taiwan was part of that story, and the real estate, the location, and its air spaces, was considered strategically important by United States. The other part of the Taiwan story has been the political movement of forces, the Kuo-Min-Tang party. And this was another massive debate. It has been covered by a professor out at the Naval Academy. He has written two books on it. I think they are both Yale University Press. He has mined the record; his name is Yu-Maochun. Professor Yu in Annapolis has mined the records of World War II showed an enormous American debate about shall we favor the Chinese Communist Party, or shall we favor the Nationalist Party. And that debate still continues today. (29:54)
When I was a graduate student, I went to Taiwan for two years to learn Chinese, I was warned by my professors, “you shouldn’t do that. If you visit Taiwan, they will destroy your relationship with China.” In Taiwan, government has been portrayed, by this side, as corrupt, a loss of civil war, fair and square, and the U.S. should not have been involve in, what’s called, the loss of China. That’s how Eisenhower actually became president. There is a brand new documentary now on PBS by Evan Thomas, on Eike’s Secret War, and it has this section on just how important George Marshall and who lost China, how important that debate was. Eisenhower chose not to back George Marshall, in the famous speech in Wisconsin, as a candidate with …Joe McCarthy’s car right behind him. It was a strategic debate over, is the Nationalist Party of China important to the United States, or is it corrupt, and the loss of civil war fair and square, and therefore, Communist China is where our interests lie.
當我還是一名研究生時，我去台灣學中文兩年。我的教授警告我，說， “你不應該這樣做。你若去台灣，他們會破壞你與中國的關係”。在台灣，他們的政府被這邊[中國的政府]描述為敗壞，內戰正大光明的輸家，美國不應該涉及所謂的遺失的中國。這就是艾森豪如何成為了總統。現在在PBS有一個全新的，埃文·湯馬斯的的紀錄片，報導埃克 [艾森豪] 的秘密戰爭，其中有一段敘說喬治馬歇爾是多麼的重要，以及誰失去了中國，和這場辯論是多麼的重要。在威斯康星州的著名的演說，艾森豪以候選人的身分，參議員喬·麥卡錫的車在他後面，艾森豪選擇不贊助喬治·馬歇爾。這是一個戰略性的辯論，辯論說，中國國民黨對美國來說，重不重要？或者是，中國國民黨是腐敗的，他們內戰輸的光明正大，因此，中國共產黨才是我們的利益的所在。
So we have both the real estate, and the distinction between the Communist Chinese Party as our partner and friend, and by the way, in 1944, 45, we began to provide the SIGINT (signals intelligence) equipment to the Chinese Communist Party. OSS [Office of Strategic Services] went up to the base, some declassified documents showed that the Chinese asked quite a few, the Chinese, Mao, himself, …asked for weapons; they wanted to go up to Washington and meet President Roosevelt, they wanted to become America’s ally against Japan, and they wanted SIGINT collection of equipment. So, in 1944, 45, there is a debate in our embassy in China, and these officers were ultimately kicked out of the Foreign Service. The Foreign Services officers went up there, and the invitation was somehow lost, the day they’d come to visit President Roosevelt (32:02).
所以，我們有這塊領土，和有中國共產黨作為我們的合作夥伴和朋友的特性，順便說一下，在1944、45年時，我們開始提供SIGINT(信號情報) 設備給中國共產黨。 戰略情報局上了基地，一些解密的文件顯示，中國要求的不少；中國，毛澤東本身，...要求武器；他們想要去華盛頓見羅斯福總統；他們想成為美國對日本的盟友；他們還希望收集情報信號的設備。所以，在1944、45年時，我們在中國的大使館裡有一個辯論，而在那裡的這些官員最後被踢出了外交部：外交官員去拜訪羅斯福總統的那天，邀請卡被莫名其妙地弄丟了（32:02）。
And this became a huge issue in American election politics in 1952. Everybody in the country knew about the George Marshall mission for almost a year to go to China. The Chinese Communist, being agrarian reformers, and therefore our potential friends, who would be bringing democracy, and the Chiang Kai-shek Kuo-Min-Tang, being fairly evil. So this split our debate on China, I would say for almost 30 years. One role of think tanks is to keep it alive, and Professor Yu… has spent many years in American archives of USS and the State Department, his two books bring out what happened. And his main theme is the Chinese manipulated this debate. They had espionage access to the American government; and they knew how to affect the debate. So it goes way back, to ‘33, ‘34.
Mark Stokes 馬克 斯托克斯 (33:23)
Dr. Pillsbury, just to clarify the… two debates, just wanted to make sure I understand, (Pillsbury: ‘cause you’re the think tank too, your role is to keep us alive; history is still with us) …could I just please change my presentation (you can’t do that…)…this is interesting. (33:42) The two debates are, what is the value of Taiwan to the United States, U.S. interest, and secondly, what is really the driving force behind Chinese Communist Party policies in the Asia Pacific region. Okay, these, I agree 100 percent. I first met Dr. Pillsbury in 1995, when I was just leaving, when I was the assistant air attache in Beijing. And, Dr. Pillsbury, when you are in Beijing, at the Embassy, especially as a young air force captain, you…aren’t quite aware of who’s who, backgrounds and things. I find him to have a very pleasant personality and since that point, couple of years on the air staff, doing the war planning, and he eventually popped up to work for Secretary Cohen and his staff and Dr. Campbell in the Clinton administration on managing U.S. defense policy towards China and Taiwan and eventually under the Bush administration for seven years, even though, seven years, Dr. Pillsbury was a valued and esteemed advisor. (34:50)
白博士，只是要澄清一下......兩次的辯論，只是想確認我理解， （白博士： '因為你也是智囊團...你的角色是要讓我們繼續下去，歷史還是在） ......我能不能改變我的簡報（你不能這樣做... ） ...這太有趣了。 33:42 ）這兩個爭論是，台灣對美國的利益有什麼價值。其次，中國共產黨在亞太地區的政策背後的驅動力到底是什麼。好了，這些，我同意了100％。我第一次見到白博士時，是在1995年，當時我是在北京，正要離開助理空軍武官。而且，白博士，當你在北京的大使館時，特別是作為一個年輕的空軍上尉，你並不是很清楚誰是誰、背景和其他。我發現他有一個非常爽快的個性，並自那時，作了幾年的空中參謀人員，策劃戰爭計劃，並且他最終跑去克林頓政府的秘書科恩和他的工作人員、還有坎貝爾博士在處理美國對中國和台灣的國防政策的工作，直到最後，在布希政府下待了七年。…白博士是一個受重視和尊敬的顧問。 （ 34:50 ）
Two, three, four times a week, It was fantastic, and until this day, his analytical skills and his innovation, his way of looking at things, his ability to communicate, have been just invaluable in terms of helping others to understand some very complex issues. But, I like these two debates. …I also like the fact that you so distinguished between the objective reality or facts, and subjective analysis, or subjective reasoning. And starting off, in looking at both of these issues, here’s a statement of facts, objective reality; (35:30) and that’s, Taiwan, under existing Republic of China’s constitution, under the current ROC constitution, exists as an independent sovereign state. This is an objective fact; objective reality. I challenge anybody to question that. Yet, people don’t think about it, but it is. You have two legitimate governments on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. One, the People’s Republic of China, and the other one, Republic of China. (35:59)
每週二、三、四次，極好的，並且直到現在，他的分析能力和他的創新力、他看待事物的方式、他的溝通能力，都一直是難能可貴的用來幫助別人理解一些非常複雜的問題。不過，我喜歡這兩個爭論。...我也喜歡你對客觀的現實或事實，和主觀的分析或主觀的推理之間的區別。從看著這兩個問題，下面是事實的陳述，客觀的現實，也就是，台灣，根據現有的中華民國的憲法下，[或]根據現行的中華民國憲法，是以一個獨立的主權國家的型態而存在的。這是一個客觀的事實，客觀的現實。我挑戰任何質疑這點的人。然而，大家並不會去想這個，但這是[客觀的現實]。台灣海峽的兩岸有兩個合法的政府。一個就是中國的人民共和國，以及另外一個就是中華民國。 （ 35:59 ）
Everything else afterwards, is, in some sense, driven by some subjectivity in terms of analysis. And it has been this way since…1949, at least, when you’ve had two legitimate governments. And, so, when you look at these two debates, …and start off in this context, it’s quite helpful to…start from there. I said subjective reality, and that’s United States does not have diplomatic relationship with Taiwan; that is a political preference, that is based upon whatever reason of interest. Basically, fear…actually, it’s based on fear of the Chinese Communist Party and the PRC, because, when you look at the situation, you spend any degree of time both in Taipei and Beijing, or both sides of the Taiwan Strait, these are two separate governments; they are both legitimate. And, it seems, it makes sense. In an ideal world, we would have relationships with both sides; both you’d have; but for U.S. interest, it just doesn’t work that way. But let’s look at these two things: what is Taiwan’s strategic value to the United States? (37:12)
And what drives the Chinese foreign policies; there are many ways, depended upon fundamental assumptions that goes into this. That fundamental assumption…has to do with…the second, what drives Beijing’s policy. People tend to interpret Beijing’s foreign policy behaviors as driven by one of two things: Basic strategies—you know you have ideal vision; you know where you want to go when you go there, strategic, basic rational actor thinking model. People would look at this and use terminologies like island chains; first, second island chain; believe that Beijing’s foreign policies and military policies are driven by geostrategic factors. That’s sort of one school of thought in this debate. (37:57)
Second school of debate would be that China’s foreign policy behavior is driven by the nature of the political system; is driven by the nature of the Chinese Communist Party, fundamental insecurities that exist within. If you use, if you sort of play off the second aspect of the debate about Chinese foreign policy that is driven by the nature of the political system in the Chinese Communist Party, Taiwan’s importance in relevance, shoots way up, in a major major way. (38:24)…What really drives the foreign policy behavior is based on fear and …concerns over legitimacy. Political legitimacy, both domestically and internationally, ‘cause the two are very much connected. If that’s the fundamental perspective and drive for their behavior, then, Taiwan, in their view, is the most significant and existential threat, to the monopoly of the CCP holds on power within the People’s Republic of China.
(38:53) Bar none. … It’s what I call [a core dash letter? (38:57)] rise above Tibet, a rise above Xinjiang. And so, Taiwan’s existence over democracy by itself, because…without saying a word, without doing anything, sends a signal to a lot of people …within China that it poses a significant challenge to the monopoly of the CCP, who has the power. Existential threat. So, what value does Taiwan have? It kind of depends on what brought up U.S. foreign policy. Is U.S. policy driven by interests or is it driven by principles?
(39:23) (If the U.S. has a value,) if the United States value the principles associated with, for example, with universal values or human rights and democracy, then one would place significant value on Taiwan. But it doesn’t always work out that way. In effect, what we have is, under the current policy of both sides of the Taiwan Strait, both the Chinese Communist Party and the Ma administration, which is democratically elected, is that, both adhere to the One-China principles. On Beijing side, there is one China, Taiwan is a part of one China, and PRC is the sole representative of China in the international community. This is the core of what they call the one country two systems approach, which has actually been around for quite a while. That precedes the Yen Jin Ying (?) (40:13) and things like these. That’s their core. So, their goal, is to be able to …forward their interest and legitimacy to subordinate the ROC or Taiwan internationally to the PRC. That is fundamental crux of the one country two system approach that they have.
如果美國有珍惜一些原則上的價值觀的話，例如，全世界都公認的價值觀，像人權和民主。如果這樣的話，那美國就會看重台灣。但是現實並不都是這樣。實際上，我們現在在台灣海峽兩邊的政策，也就是中國共產黨一邊、和由民主選舉而產生的馬政府一邊，這兩邊的政策都堅持一個中國的原則。北京方面認為，有一個中國，台灣是中國的一部分，而中華人民共和國是中國在國際社會的唯一代表。這就是他們所謂的一國兩制做法的核心；其實這已經實現了相當長的一段時間了。這比Yen Jin Ying [?] 和其他類此的還重要。這是他們的核心。所以，他們的目標，是要能把他們的興趣和合法性轉向中華民國或台灣，使中華民國或台灣在國際上會服從中國。這是他們的一國兩制觀點的基本要點。
(40:31) The Ma administration believes that there is one China; Taiwan is a part of the one China, and … one China means the ROC, period. That sounds incredible, but that’s just, it’s their policy. It helps in putting things in a different perspective. So, with this being the framework, you can imagine what the leaders in Beijing may think of a government policy of a one China, in some ways, as saying, China’s Communist policy is not as legitimate as a government as a democracy is. And, to me, it’s worth supporting, regardless of what government is elected in Taipei, ‘cause, as Dr. Pillsbury has mentioned, in terms of history relations, there’s the debate going on between whether or not the United States should support the Chinese Communist Party or the Nationalist. Well, that debate has transformed, (because, in reality,) what we are dealing with, is a debate over, in terms of legitimacy, do we support an authoritarian regime of Beijing, in terms of extending legitimacy, or do we extend legitimacy towards democracy, regardless of whether it’s KMT or DPP [reason?] of the political spectrum.
That decision was pretty much made by Henry Kissinger in 1971, when he decided to, at least, begin to move to replace the ROC in the United Nations, and was locked in by President Carter, and has become even more problematic since Taiwan has evolved into a democracy. So, in effect, U.S. policy, today, by not extending equal legitimacy to both sides of the Taiwan Strait, in terms of political legitimacy, in effect, it has made a decision that it supports the authoritarian system over that of democracy. In that context, sort of defeat that debate.
(42:11) So, with having said that, the idea and the ideal of having normal relations on both sides of the Taiwan Strait within the one China framework, it’s certainly possible that, in terms of having a normal relations over both sides of the Taiwan Strait, in extending legitimacy to both governments within the one China framework, it’s certainly possible. As a matter of fact, this was a key debate all the way between the United States, in the late 1950s until 1971. That debate was played out within the United Nations having to do with what they called the “Important Question”. Important Question having to do with representation, because there was the General Predisposition of the State Department, the General Predisposition, even if the mainstream academic community, based on the National Conference on U.S.-China relations that evolved into the international community relations [sic]. And the general consensus back then was, actually, to move toward normal relations within the both sides of the Taiwan Strait, within the one China framework, extending legitimacy to both sides. However, apparently, of course, Beijing was opposed to that; Chiang Kai-Shek was not all that pleased with that based upon his own view that there can be only one China.
However, his positions, in my understanding, were not universal; his positions did not necessarily reflect the general consensus within the government at that time on top of Taipei, there was, again, I highly recommend the reading of Jay Taylor’s History of Chiang Kai-Shek, you’ll be able to get a good sense of…(interrupted by Dr. Pillsbury: May I just second that motion? ... Jay Taylor, on Hidden History, Jay Taylor has dug out the debate, in which Chiang Kai-Shek refused the idea “let’s keep Taiwan in the General Assembly, even though we lose our Security Council seat”. So, once again, Taiwan made a decision. Now, today, Taiwan wants back in the U.N., but Chiang Kai-shek, who made this decision, and Jay Taylor, who points it out in his book, also, secret talks going on between Beijing and Taiwan during this period in the ’70s that we did not know about; Americans did not know about. Is that right?) (44:25)
然而，他的觀點，據我的理解，並不普遍；他的觀點並不一定反映當時在台北的政府內部的高級官員一般的共識。我再次強烈建議傑伊泰勒 (Jay Taylor) 的 “蔣介石的的歷史” 這本書，你會得到一個很好的觀念...（白博士：我要附和他所說的... 傑伊泰勒，在 “隱藏的歷史”裡，傑伊泰勒找出來的，其中一個辯論，蔣介石拒絕了“雖然我們失去了[聯合國]安理會的席位，讓我們保留台灣在[聯合國]大會上” 的主意。所以，再一次，台灣做了一個決定。而今天，台灣想要回到聯合國，但是蔣介石當時做了這個決定，現在由傑伊泰勒指出蔣作此決定這一點在他的書裡。另外，傑伊泰勒也指出一些甚至我們美國人也都不知道，在70 年代這期間，在北京和台灣之間所發生的密談，對不對？）（44:25）
Well, this goes back a long way…What Jay Taylor outlines, also, was debates and how information was important, out of U.S. representatives’ office in China. For example…the debates between Claire Chennault, Air Force, I met him a little bit,…sort of bias toward him, and Joseph Stilwell. Stilwell, for some reason, ever since 1920s or 30s, has something against Chiang Kai-shek. He just didn’t like him. Whereas Chennault had a very different perspective. And this was played out…in terms of U.S. policies, framing and shaping perspectives of the political leadership. But fast forwarding to at least 1979, …the obvious solution is to have the normal relations with both; two legitimate governments with normal relations with both sides, and make that fit within the one China policy. (45:23)
那麼，這要追溯到很久以前......傑伊泰勒的重點是辯論，和從美國在中國代表的辦公室，透露出來的消息的重要性。例如...在美國空軍的陳納德，我遇過他，...所以會有一點偏向他，陳納德和約瑟夫·史迪威之間的辯論。史迪威，出於某種原因，自從1920年代或 ’30年代時，就有一些反對蔣介石；他就是不喜歡他，而陳納德有一個非常不同的觀點。而這些不同的觀點，在美國政策方面被展現出來，制定和塑造了政治領導人的觀點。轉到至少1979年，顯而易見的解決方法就是與雙方都有正常的關係，…並配合在一個中國政策的範圍內。 （45:23）
Today, would either the DPP or KMT oppose the United States having normal relations with the ROC? I cannot imagine what every president on Taiwan, since Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Ching-guo, Lee Tung-hui, Chen Shui-bian, Ma Ying-jeou, has stated in one form or another, that Taiwan, under the existing ROC constitution, exists as an independent sovereign state. If that statement has been made, why would they refuse the extension of the legitimacy to be granted upon that particular government? As a substitute for having normal relations with both sides, the Taiwan Relations Act, in effect, functions as a rough substitute. …But the question remains how sustainable is U.S. policy on the Taiwan Relations Act. On the security side, it consists of two major components: one is to provide Taiwan with weapons of defensive character, for Taiwan to have necessary defensive articles or services. And the second part of it is to maintain the capacity to respond, to use force, or other forms, of course. The first one is well covered. Let’s just spend one minute talking about the second part—to maintain the capacity. 今天，民進黨或國民黨會反對美國和中華民國有正常的關係嗎？我無法想像，每一位在台灣的總統，從蔣介石，蔣經國，李登輝，陳水扁，到馬英九，已以某種形式或另一種表示；台灣，根據現行的中華民國憲法，是作為一個獨立的主權國家而存在的。如果他們有這種說法，那他們為什麼會拒絕[美國]授予他們的政府，使他們的政府變成有合法性？實際上，台灣關係法是作為替代兩方都有正常的關係，而成的粗略的替代品。 ......但問題仍是，美國的政策能夠對台灣關係法持續著嗎？在安全方面，[台灣關係法]有兩個主要部分：一個就是給台灣提供防禦性的武器，使台灣能有他們需要的防衛設備或軍隊。而第二部分就是讓他們有能力去反應，使用武力或其他方法。第一個已討論過了，讓我們只花一分鐘講第二部分，以保持[反應的]能力。
Just throwing out another debate going on in Washington, I think, and that is between the air and sea battle and off-shore control (46:41). Air and sea battle, if you recent[ly] read the documents, it basically claims that, if the United States is to maintain the capacity to defend Taiwan, it would require possibly, at least, having the ability, having that arrow in the back pocket, the ability to interdict [?] single points of failure in the PLA operational system that could be used in the event of an attempt to physically occupy Taiwan (47:07), and enforce it and then impose its control over the remainder of the island. Unlikely scenario, but still possible, and one that should be front and center of any planner of specific command or other parts of U.S. defense establishment. Offshore control, in effect, …says, declares, or advocates a unilateral declaratory policy in favor of no interdiction of missions in the event of a conflict. So, in effect, offshore control…is, what it is in a way, unless they can be able to prove that the U.S. can maintain the capacity to respond to the use of force, in a way, is actually, abandoning Taiwan, just as … is an arm sales freeze. So it’s just something to throw out there, an aspect of the debate.
As a final note, (in terms of …) what it all comes down to, another debate that should be going on, or has gone on, in terms of some specific arms sale issues, is, there has been a lot of attention granted on F-16s, which is certainly important. But if you asked five different people, who look at Taiwan defense issues, you can probably see five different opinions in terms of what the priority is. (48:17) My favorite is, and as long as it has been, diesel electric submarines. Diesel electric submarines—and it’s just a fascinating story, when you go into the history and how this particular issue relates to other things. 1969, it was called the Nixon Doctrine or the Guam doctrine in terms of what it looked like, that the United States was withdrawing from the Asia-Pacific region, was when Taiwan submitted its first request in the first statement of the interest in these letters about the submarines.
They approached the Nixon administration, and the Nixon administration did actually say okay, we will turn over two used submarines, the Guppies [Greater Underwater Propulsion Power Programs], that were turned over and agreed to in 1971. Now, there was fighting for a while, but the United States eventually got out of the conventional submarine game and moved into the nuclear submarines. But there was a movement in early 1990s in which the industry was beginning to look at genie up in the ship building industries to be able to gen up… the reconstitute on the diesel submarine market, to be able to satisfy the other requirements in other parts of the world. (49:26) So Taiwan began to generate …formal requests through the arms sales talks over these electric submarines. The response, starting 1994, was… nobody in hell know. Don’t even look at it on this question. Starting in ’98, there actually was a change, a shift of heart, and said, let’s actually take a close look at this. About two evaluation teams visited Taiwan, …based on the question, which is, is there a valid requirement, came back with what should have been obvious answer: yes, of course there is a requirement.
So, finally, on April 21st, President Bush announced that the United States would assist Taiwan in its acquisition of the diesel electric submarines. Very important work: would assist Taiwan in its acquisition—that’s somewhat telling. (It left open,) this, in effect, it was a shift in policy, and how this would perceive was really left open. One route was for military sales, another for Taiwan to submit a formal request for the United States to manage the program to supply 8-12 diesel electric submarines to Taiwan. The other route was, Taiwan assumes the responsibility on its own and then use direct routes to be able to work with the U.S. defensive industry to come up with a viable solution. (The, very quickly,) after the decision, the Chief of the Joint of Staffs on the Taiwan side, and the navy, [saying May Day?]… made a decisive call to be able to pursue submarine program through FMS [Foreign Military Sales] channels, foreign military channels. Notice, the U.S. government would have been responsible for release of all obligations to be able to provide that capability.
所以，最後， 在4月21日，布希總統宣布，美國將協助台灣取得柴電潛艇[的要求]。非常重要的工作：將協助台灣取得柴電潛艇---這是有點說服力的。這一點，其實是一個政策上的轉變，而此轉變將如何被解釋，則沒有人知道。一種是用在於軍事銷售，另一個是要台灣自己正式地提出要求，要求美國管理提供8-12柴電潛艇給台灣的程序。[又]另一條路線是，台灣自己當起責任，然後用直接路線，以便能夠與美國國防工業合作，找出一個可行的解決方法。在決定後，台灣方面的參謀長，和海軍， [?] 做了一個果斷的決定：要透過FMS [對外軍事銷售]的渠道來追求潛艇計劃。注意到，無論如何，美國政府到最後也是要負責，釋放所有的責任，才能夠做到這一點。
Since then, bear in mind [while (?)] this was going on at the time, there was some significant issues going on within Taiwan, related to economic downturn and a whole range of other things, but the program has been frozen, (51:22) in effect, since then. There [were] a lot of things that were unfair on the U.S. side in terms of how this issue was approached and how this issue was managed. But, today, there is an opportunity to be able to move forward effectively….I believe there is consensus on Taiwan between both sides of the political spectrum, that Taiwan side, I believe, are their top, became, priority. There are things that appear, in terms of moving forward, with the domestic program, one problem, though, is that, my understanding is that, there is, at least, a perception on the part of the U.S. defense industry, that they have been told, by, at least, significant elements within the U.S. government, not to do anything to support Taiwan in its acquisition. No technical assistance, don’t…be active in anything. (52:11)
從那時起，記住，這當時正在進行中，有一些顯著的問題，涉及到經濟衰退和其他許多東西，在台灣內部正在進行，但是自那時起，該計劃已被凍結。在美國方面，有關如何看待和處理這個問題中，有很多事情是不公平。但是，今天，有一個機會能夠有效的向前邁進....我相信台灣的藍綠兩黨是有共識，要讓台灣方面 [此問題] 站上風，成為優先。針對國內計畫的向前邁進，有出現了一個問題，據我所了解的，就是美國國防工業的一部分，他們見解就是，他們被美國政府內部高官告知，不要做任何支持台灣取得 [武器] 的事情。沒有技術援助，不要主動的做任何事。
I don’t think it’s true, personally. However, it would help if there were some public clarification. If there were some statement that came out of the Obama Administration, perhaps reporting requirement of the Congress that asked that question or a letter from the Congress that asks that question. Has there been purposeful discouragement…extended to the U.S. defense industry not to give or pursue technical assistance agreements that could be reviewed on a fair basis in terms of tech transfer concerns and controls or some things like that. To me, that would be worthwhile. (52:50)…But this is an important program, and I think it would, among all the capabilities that are out there, one I think would have significant effect both on deterring and on defense. With that, I’ll turn it back over to you.(53:02)
Seth Cropsey (克羅波西):
I’ll turn it back to you for a second. Are there any signs, Mark, that the Administration’s current willingness, for example, to call the PRC pugnacious or to go after cyber indictments is having an effect on the submarine question? I mean, is there any connection between those, …is the left arm and the right arm communicating with each other?
Mark Stokes 斯托克斯
…It may. Bear in mind that, …you have two routes that are going. One is the foreign military sales route, the other the direct course sales route. You actually have a letter for request, or actually, correction, notification that’s been frozen since 2007. And, so, in terms of the U.S. government, in terms of how, what else is going on, how it could affect here, it kind of depends on the decision to be made. And, decisions are being made, pretty much, to freeze that FMS side. The decision now, if…Taiwan, if the ROC Navy assumes the responsibility for program and then decides to enter, in turn, contraction (?) obligations for the U.S. industry to be able to support that effort… doing like that every part [would need?] export licenses (?), (54:21) which tends to be somewhat down in the weeds, much less political. And I think…it would be hard to fathom the Obama Administration reversing a commitment made in 2001, by not assisting Taiwan in its acquisition by a blanket refusal for licensing.
Bear in mind, there are precedents, there are many, many precedents. For example, there was this Congressional notification that, I believe, three years ago, on the, to be able to afford the transfer of submarine launched weapons, and that’s a clear precedent. And bear in mind, that Taiwan does have four submarines today, and licenses, I presume, to come through every single day for spare parts and supply chains to be able to maintain those boats. So, it’s inconceivable that, if a license were to be submitted for an honest and fair review, that that would be refused based on political reasons.
Thank you, Mark. Misha?
Misha Auslan 米沙 奧斯林
Seth, thank you very much. (55:30) I hadn’t heard the comments by Secretary Burns, so you know, “pugnacious”, it’s a good move. I’ll be worried when we call the Chinese obstreperous. But then I think we gotta start getting concerned about where we are moving to. Michael, particularly, you know, I was going to talk about all these other stuff, but you made me think about this glorious hidden history of missed opportunities between the U.S. and soon to be communist despots around the world. There is a whole think tank program there that we’ve got, Lenin trying to meet Dulles in Switzerland in 1917, we’ve got Marshall and Mao, as you’ve said; we’ve got Castro trying to be drafted by the Washington senators. …The history of the 20th century could have been entirely different. (56:18) (Interrupted: plenty of Wall Street Journal op-eds here)
賽斯，非常感謝你。我沒有聽到伯恩斯局長的評論，所以你知道，“侵略性”，這是一個很好的舉措。當我們用” 喧囂的” 來稱呼中國時，我就會擔心了。但後來我想我們得開始關注我們所要往哪個方向走。白博士，特別是，你知道，我本來要談所有這些其他的東西，但你讓我想到這個光榮隱藏於歷史中，美國很快將成為世界各地的共產主義暴君之間的良機錯失。我們有一整個智囊團的方案，1917年，列寧在瑞士試圖會見杜勒斯，你剛提到的馬歇爾和毛澤東，還有，卡斯楚試圖選拔華盛頓的參議員[?]。 ......20世紀的歷史本來可以變得完全不同。（被打斷：有大量的華爾街日報專欄文章談這些）
It really is. That, I think is where we are going to be moving to as soon as we close up today. I thought, before that, I would, maybe, try to step back a little bit, because we’ve got so much, deep, not only knowledge, but experience on the part of all three of my fellow panelists here. And maybe try to open the aperture a little bit, and talk about Taiwan and the larger risk picture of Asia or risk map, if you will, of Asia. Seth actually had started us off this morning by talking about the oil rig contretemps between China and Vietnam and we woke up this morning to news that the Thai military had admitted that it had carried out a coup, so we are now in a full coup situation in Thailand and North Korea and South Korea exchanging some obviously, a former naval officer said, we are cringing at the fact that no one could hit anything on the water, but they were lobbying some type of shells back and forth.
So, by any data points that you wanna look at, I think, the risk factor in Asia seems to be increasing. The data points don’t indicate that risk is decreasing. That is separate from predicting that there is going to be conflict or war or whatever, but there is no real indication that we’re moving away from more tension and contention over all these issues that we’ve been talking about here, whether it’s think tank that Michael has pointed out, or in other places for the past decade. (We’re not getting into a situation where there is,) we’ve moved into an era of bilateral or multilateral solutions of these problems or agreement on how these problems should be solved. And, instead, I think, if we take a step or two back, and away from the daily headlines, risk in Asia is increasing, and I think you can actually identify the risk cycle in Asia that probably starts with feelings of uncertainty about the future.
And, again, winding the tape back a little bit, not quite as far back as Michael went, but, winding the tape back 10 years or so, or 15 years, a lot of uncertainty about where China would be going as it started to show that it was able to develop in ways that, even before that, people thought that it might not develop that kind of military, that kind of navy, air force capability and the like, and that, so that uncertainty, then, leads into feelings of insecurity. And clearly, we’ve been in that phase for a while, as it is the second term of that risk cycle. The sense of insecurity, on the part of many nations, and it sort of spreads out. Initially, you have a direct sense of insecurity or a greater sense of insecurity being expressed by countries like Japan, or South Korea, or Taiwan, and then, for example, if we are talking about South East Asia, you’d always come up against these comments by our South East Asian friends, … “let’s not push it too far with China”; “We’re not as worried,” “We don’t have the same problems”.
並再次的，倒回一點點，沒有像白博士所說的那麼早，但是，回到10年前左右，或15年前，很多關於中國的去向是沒有把握的，因為中國當時開始表明，它能夠如何發展，即使在那之前，大家都認為中國不可能開發那種軍隊、那種海軍、空軍的能力等之類的；而且，這樣的不確定性，就會發展成不安全感。並明確的，我們在那個階段已經有一段時間，因為是在風險週期的第二期。對許多國家的不安全感，現在會有點向外擴散。最初，一些國家，如日本，或韓國或台灣，都有一個直接的不安全感或更大的不安全感被表達出來；然後，例如說，如果我們在談論東南亞地區的話，我們在東南亞的這些朋友都會提出他們的這些意見， ...... “我們不要把與中國的事情搞得更大”;“我們沒有那麼的擔心”，“我們沒有同樣的問題”。
But today, that’s dramatically different. Even Malaysia now, talks about its concerns over Chinese encroachment and Chinese…activities. So, that sense of insecurity has grown. And I think that the final term of that risk cycle will lead you into instability. And we clearly have that. We have that in the East China Sea over the Senkaku’s; we have in the South China Sea over the drilling rig or the Scarborough Shoal, or the Second Thomas Reef, or other areas in the Paracel’s and the like. (59:54) We have been steadily moving through that risk cycle without any indication, to use another traditional term, that the nations have found an off-ramp. They have not potentially gone fully on to that highway of conflict; we don’t have outright fighting. But there’s no indication that the nations have, either among themselves, determined how they can get to an off-ramp, or really, have much interest at this point. So, that sense, I think is one of the bigger pictures that we should begin with. (1:00:30)
For the U.S., then, trying to fit U.S. into that picture, despite the pivot, and I’ll mention that again in a few seconds, it seems clear that Washington is becoming increasingly risk averse at the moment that risk is increasing in Asia, and that’s due to our sets of issues over the past almost 15 years now. The wars in Iraq and in Afghanistan, economic crisis and barely discernible recovery at home except for the equity markets. The U.S. in its articulation, to the extent that it does articulate its concerns and its preferences, risk aversion seems to be the guiding principle. I think that is in part, due to two factors that feed into that.
The first is a muddled strategy. And, to go back a little bit further, and maybe actually paired up, chronologically, a little bit more with where Michael was, I think we are still struggling with defining our role in the world in the post Cold War world. I think it goes back to 1991, I don’t think we’ve ever fully figured out what we’ve wanted to do. And you had George H.W. Bush’s New World Order, which never really cohered. You had a holiday from history in the 1990’s, then you had 2001, you had 9-11, and,… it depends on how you viewed history, whether we’ve been knocked off course from where we might have been, or this is how history always plays out. It is simply a series of endless contingencies and for the most part, the vast part, countries are reactive, so you can’t really say, well, we would have been here, if not for X or Y, because X or Y always happens.
But I think it is fair to say that, since the end of the Cold War, we have really struggled to try to figure out what role we are playing in the world, which is why so many people have, in some ways, almost welcomed the return of Russia in Ukraine as giving a CODA to where we have been over the past 20 years. There’s a clarity back to understanding where we are. And, in fact, that’s, let me mention more of that in a second, but I would say, first, we have this question of muddled strategy. And part of that muddled strategy is what we, as Asianist, Seth was talking about, for the past couple of years, the pivot, the rebalance, which I think many of us agree. First of all, I say many of us agree is a good idea. We are Asianist, we think it’s good that the country focus more on Asia. We like that. It’s good for business. It’s good for us to be more engaged.
But it’s really been a hollow balance, or a hollow pivot, and I think that is becoming clearer and clearer, because of the fact that the Administration never really articulated what the pivot was for, what the rebalance was for. There were pieces recently that took the task, the pivot deniers, it was called, there was the rebalance deniers, I was proud to be exhibit A in that. But the piece itself started off with listing the enormous amount of activities that we already have with Asia, the enormous amount of trade, the enormous amount of economic, political, social, cultural, military engagement that we have, which, to me, immediately begs the question that, then, why do you need rebalance. What is your point for the pivot and the rebalance, which is not to say, it is not a good idea. It’s simply that it was never articulated.
So, everyone could read into the pivot what they wanted, and therefore be disappointed, when it didn’t live up to their expectations, whether you’re friends or adversaries, or whomever. So, the first part, I think, of America’s risk averses is that we really don’t know what we wanna do. So we have this muddled strategy. The second part is a little bit more concrete, and that’s the reduced resources that we have chosen to inflict upon ourselves. Despite a $13 trillion economy, we have decided that we are going to dramatically cut our ability to conduct operations and maintenance for our forces around the world, that we are going to keep the level of our commitment, in fact, add on, in some ways, new commitments, again, adds to a larger strategy, but add on new commitments, or making it harder and harder to actually carry that out and be effective, and that I think, feeds back into a political cycle of being uncertain and unsure, and risk averse, that we see in Asia. (1:05:10)
I think what, if I can really broaden this out to throw in Russia and Ukraine for a second and why it’s important in Asia and the Asian context. I think we’re just at the cusp…of recognizing that we face the very last thing that we wanted for the coming decade or even the coming generation. And that’s a two-front war. And here, all of the analogies that are so easy to throw out with Rome and the United States, I think, actually, have a little bit of purchase. We face a two-front war in the same way that the Romans did…If you look at the Danube and Rhine borders, they face generations of what we would, today, call the non-state actors, barbarians, and the legions had to be out there forever, dealing with incursions, trying to protect the borders and the like.
That is the result, I would argue, of our 14 years of fighting the global war on terror. We have the director of the DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency], or immediately, the past director of the DIA coming out in an article just this week saying, we are more in danger today than we were before. We have the heads of the Congressional intelligence committees, the HPSCI [House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence) and the SSCI [Senate Select Committee on Intelligence], saying we are at more risk than before, that al Qaeda has changed and metastasized, decentralized, and the like. We have DNI [Director of National Intelligence] tell us the same thing. This is the new normal for us; this is our future. These are the barbarians on the borders. For us, my kids’ generation, maybe beyond that, that’s never going away. And as a country, we have never faced that, and we don’t know how to deal with that, quite frankly. We have the good war as our template, or the not so good wars, but they still ended—Korea, Vietnam; this war never ends.
And we haven’t yet accepted that fact, and, instead, what we want to do, as the President tries to tell us that it’s over, combat operations are done, al Qaeda is on the run, let’s get back to some type of normal. And that’s not happening. But even as we didn’t accept that, what China represents in Asia, and what Russia represents in Europe, is a return of what Rome faced on its eastern borders; Parthia, for example. Great powers, not hegemonic powers, not powers that could supplant or replace Rome, but great powers that could cause enormous disruption, enormous suffering, change borders, consume vast amounts of the time and energy in a tension and treasure of Rome, in order to maintain stability. And you can even extend it further and bring in the economics of the eastern part of the Empire in a way that we’re very concerned about economics in Asia.
That’s what we face now. We thought that, again, Francis Fukuyama that the history had ended and he was proved wrong twice: once, with 9-11, and once with the return of the great powers. And whether you want to call Putin a Hitler-act-alike, not in his ideologies, but in his salami-slicing aggression, or simply 19th century Czarist revengeism, or whether you want to call China the same thing. We face a generation now of the return of the old fashioned state-on-state great power tussling, for influence borders, regions of freedom of activity and the like. We face a two-front war. We haven’t admitted it, we don’t want to admit it; all we can talk about in the counting days what we cannot do, not what we may have to do.
And, so, from that perspective, what we see in Asia…cannot be disaggregated, should not be disaggregated. From that much bigger picture, that an exhausted, broke, distracted country, is actually entering a phase of greater instability and greater threat to its national interest. And the interest of its partners and friends in the system that it helped to create, nurtured, and from which it benefited more than any other nation, that that is actually the game that we are about to undertake. Whether or not we have the wit to recognize it, the will to respond to it, and the strength to deal with it, are entirely open questions. And at this point, I would say that they are all trending in the negative, which is why I would say it probably a more inchoate [?] (1:09:51) sense, you see Americans respond at least in some way to these questions about the world by saying enough, let’s focus, we’re not the world’s policemen, we’ve done our bit for God and country, and it’s time we can get back and focus on important things like the All-Star break.
We need to move away from where we have been. The problem with all of this, of course, is that the world is not a vacuum and that what we do does not happen in a vacuum. And so, the muddled strategy that we have in Asia, I would argue, is just a symptom of a much larger problem that we’re facing today. And at the core of that, in some way, Taiwan lies at the core of that. I wouldn’t say it’s the single flash point that we face, but it is something that is very indicative of how the United States will respond to the changes, at least, on one of these borders, if not the other of these borders. And whether we recognize the degree to which the geopolitical equation globally but in Asia is shifting. 1:11:05
Were we to significantly, as we are trending to, change the tenor of our commitments to Taiwan, maybe not formally on paper, or whatever papers we have, but in terms of our articulation of those commitments, and I think you saw that, actually, most recently with Assistant Secretary Russel’s testimony before Senator Rubio where Senator Rubio pressed him over and over on the Six Assurances and could not get an answer about that, and instead, it was a part of a much bigger global interpretation of where the U.S. stands in Asia. I think that may give us some ideas about how we are beginning to shift our own sense of which risks we are willing to bear in this changed environment. And I would end just simply by saying that I think that leads to at least three diagnostic implications. Again, I’d rather not be prescriptive today, but I’d rather be diagnostic.
(1:12:06) The first is that it’s simply, by default, [it] increases this fear, or the freedom of action, this fear of influence of China in the region that we are very concerned about. And Mark said, you’ve gotta look at, are you looking at it geostrategically, or are you internally from China. And from geostrategically, meaning first island, second island and so on and so forth. These are still important factors both in Chinese thinking as well as the thinking of our friends and allies. So, the fact that we seem to be ceding some of that water space, at least, until intellectually, I think, just were downs [?] to what China feels is its ability to have more freedom of action; that would be number one.
Number two, is by settling for a sub-optimal security environment, meaning one in which China has far more freedom to do with what it wants in Asia, the U.S. simply, then, has a, almost an automatic rebound effect, raises the risks of our intervention anywhere cross the board. And that doesn’t have to be intervention in terms of sending in the 7th Fleet, but any way in which we determine that we need to start getting involved, we immediately, as a first step, consider that the risk element is much higher, and I think that you’ve seen that, in our response to the territorial disputes in both East and South China Seas. Whether we wanted to get more involved or not, we have been more concerned about that risk element.
And then, third, that leads naturally to, at least, a, I don’t want to go so strong as to call it undermining, but a questioning of our allying structure in the region. These are very old alliances now; they are a half-century old alliances and the question is, what are we really willing to do at any point with respect to them? We have already been impressed by Japan; the President finally came out and said that the Senkakus are under Article V [of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security]. We’ve been impressed by the Philippines. We have lots of unanswered questions about where we really would draw the line with what we would do with our alliances and not do with our alliances. So, I think if you wanted to start just looking forward to wind up, these are three of the results that we may be facing, when you put the changes in the geopolitical picture in Asia into that much larger, truly global geopolitical construct, and what I think the U.S. is facing is this two-front war, in a coming generation that we’ve neither identified nor are prepared for. Thank you. (1:14:34)
I’d like to thank our panelists, I mean, we’ve got a very clear picture of the history of the U.S.-Taiwan security relations from Michael, Mark has offered an equally articulate picture of the current state of security relations between Taiwan and the United States, and I think Misha’s ability to place us in a strategic context, it is as accurate as it is eloquent. … (1:15:59)
Q & A
Mike Fonte; Director of the Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party Mission in Washington (1:16:05) 邁克·豐特;台灣民進黨駐華盛頓主任
Thanks to the panel; very informative, it is. A little piece of history that I think is important to both Mike and Mark put together: when Kissinger negotiated the first communiqué with his friend, Zhou Enlai, and friends, he negotiated to get the draft, my understanding is, to give to Mr. Rogers, Secretary of State. And it said, as you know, that the U.S. only acknowledges, it doesn’t recognize that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait believe that there is only one China, and Taiwan is part of China. Rogers looked at that and said, ooh, I don’t think that all the people in Taiwan believe that. And that fact, it seems to me, has grown significantly over the course of time. As Taiwan has become a democracy, as open debate has been allowed, as people began to become really masters of their own fate, which they were not in 1971 or ‘79 when the KMT was still in control under the martial law, so that’s a factor that seems to me, plays into what Mark laid out, about the question of the one China framework.
President Ma, in goodwill, I believe, believes that there’s a one China, of which there is a mainland part and a Taiwan part; it’s all part of the ROC….But that’s a complicating factor now. We have to take into account (1:17:29), and I believe that, I hope that the DPP will be able to come back into power, of course, but I also hope that the U.S. will stay neutral the next time around, because the last time in 2012, we had put our thumb on the scale a bit, in terms of the KMT. So I’d like to hear whatever thoughts you have about that point, because I think it’s really a very important point at this point in history. Thanks.
Mark Stokes (1:17:56) 斯托克斯
A very quick point on that. Yes, in some ways, you have the two-way China principles, Beijing and Taipei. I think U.S. policy is pretty clear, and, if, what I said before that the framework where it is right now where the Taiwan Relations Act being a rough substitute for having normal relations with both sides of the Taiwan Strait, the TRA is pretty clear about the territorial delineation. Is it not? … that’s U.S. policy…let’s not…dictate a solution on Taiwan solution on how the two sides of the Strait will work out their… differences, stuff, the two sides, from the …one China policy perspective is that the U.S. doesn’t take sides. That’s one China policy in a nutshell. It seems to me, just don’t take sides and debate in issues that should be worked out domestically among people on Taiwan in democratic fashion and between democratic government of Taiwan and those other guys in Beijing.
Pillsbury (1:18:59) 白瑞邦博士
I have a slightly different view. It’s a very important issue to China, whether the United States directly supports your political party, the DPP party. In the last election, a former…Reagan administration two NSC [National Safety Council] staffer named Doug Paal, was publicly chastised by a former senator named Frank Murkowski…I can’t tell if they were on a bus together, or what exactly happened, …the Senator attacked the former NSC staffer for praising President Ma’s victory, and saying something negative about the DPP. If you read…the Hidden History, my theme today, there’s a lot we don’t know; it’s very good that you bring up the Communiqué, I don’t think even all that story is completely out yet. (1:20:03) There is a brand new book besides Mayday, which is an excellent book to buy by Seth Cropsey about American seapower in decline and the challenges in Asia.
Another new book is called Maximalist; it’s really excellent; it’s got excellent reviews everywhere. The author is Steve Sestanovich. He has a whole new chapter on U.S.-China relations, and what happened in 1972, ’73. He’s found some new top secret eyes only recons, involving what President Nixon said to the Chinese. One of his findings is that Nixon and Kissinger told the Chinese, if you are stronger, when you become really strong someday, we Americans can do less. So we want that. It’s quite different from what Misha is implying—somehow Americans are taking risks by doing less. The book argues their policy towards China, but in other policies as well, a varied by presidents, what he calls the maximalist: he puts Ronald Reagan at the top of the maximalist; Harry Truman number two. And then re-trenchers, who really want to pull back. (1:21:17)
另一本新書叫叱吒風雲；它真是優秀；有極高的評語隨處可見。作者是史蒂夫Sestanovich。他對美國與中國的關係，和在1972年和 '73間發生了什麼事，有一個全新的篇章。他發現了一些新的偵查機密資料，涉及尼克森總統對中國說的話。他的一個發現是，尼克森和基辛格告訴中國，如果你是強大一點的話，當你成為真正強大的一天，我們美國就可以少做一點了 。因此，我們希望出現這種情況。這是與米沙的暗示完全不同，美國人寧願冒 “作得較少” 的險。這本書認為每個總統對中國的政策，還有其他政策也一樣，都不太一樣；他所謂的最高綱領，他把雷根總統排在最頂部；杜魯門總統第二。然後是那些比較低調的，比較保守的。
And he shows how, what Nixon and Kissinger were doing in these new memos was a very deliberate world they wanted to go to: five poles, five equal poles; not primacy of the United States, and certainly not the G2 with China. And to do that, the strategy, the grand strategy, of President Nixon, was to build up China. And that was continued by President Reagan. Did much more. Some of Reagans’ new NSDDs [National Security Decision Directives] have been declassified. I got them out of the Reagan Library, actually. President Reagan approved six arms sales to China, denied arms sales to Taiwan, and started a technology sharing program. As part of the strategy, which is in these NSDDs, to explicitly build up China. And by then, (boss,) Secretary Weinberger was sent to China twice, tried to build China into a strong power.
Now, that explicit goal has never gone away; it’s not been removed; those decisions have never been rescinded. And so, if you are inside of the U.S. government now, you’d still think, building a strong China is part of America’s strategy toward China.
So when I bring up the Hidden History and the need for debate, I’m appealing to really famous op-ed writers, like Joe Bosco, the former Pentagon-China Desk member, and Rick Fisher from the Heritage Foundation, and others, who write about today’s debate, need to go back over, were these decisions based on correct assumptions at the time. For example, the offer to make sure Japan never plays a role in the security of Taiwan—this is made by Henry Kissinger, President Nixon, and was continued by other presidents. Brzezinski brings it up in his memoirs. So, is that still a wise policy, to make sure Japan has no role whatsoever in Taiwan’s security?
There’s something that the Taiwan government can do. President Ma has said, I think he’s joking, but I’m not sure, he said he’s already asked 12 times for the F-16 CD model to be sold to Taiwan, just to replace the F-16s they’ve lost. There has been no progress. Forty-seven senators wrote a letter to President Obama, why can’t you sell these 55 F-16’s? No action! I maintain that this is explained by the Hidden History and the restraints that are on Taiwan. The short range weapons are okay. Apache helicopters with hellfire missiles, you would think that’s aggressive. But hellfire missiles will sink ships. Taiwan has explained to us, …if an invasion has taken place from other ship, and other ships have to transfer to smaller amphibious landing crafts, and at that moment of transfer, we need Apache helicopters, by Boeing, they are expensive, fire hellfire missiles and sink the landing craft and the mother ship at the moment of transfer. Actually, it’s a pretty clever idea.
其實有一些事是台灣的政府可以做的。馬總統曾說，我覺得他是在開玩笑，但是我沒有把握，他說，他已經要求[美國]出售，取代他們失去了的F - 16戰鬥機的F - 16的CD型給台灣，要求12次了。一直沒有進展。有四十七名參議員致信給奧巴馬總統，你為什麼不能賣這55架的F- 16呢？沒有行動！我認為這問題和台灣有的一些限制障礙在隱藏的歷史上是都有解釋的。短程武器都還可以。有地獄火導彈的阿帕奇直升機；你可能會認為這是太積極了。但是地獄火導彈可以把船炸沉。台灣有向我們解釋， ......如果有別的船隻入侵，使另外的船舶必須轉移到較小的兩棲登陸艇，並在那轉移的一刻，我們需要波音公司所造的，很昂貴的，我們可以發射地獄火導彈使登陸艇和母船在轉移的時刻下沉。其實，這是一個非常聰明的想法。
So they were sold; they were approved by the past administration and by President Obama. Things that are short range are okay. F-16 CDs, if you go to the website for the F-16, you’ll see it’s really a fighter bomber. It can carry bombs quite a ways; two-, three-hundred miles easily. That will be able to attack, as Mark said, that could be part of air/sea battle strategy to…[hit] targets inside China. Now, AEI [American Enterprise Institute] took the lead. By 2008, AEI in many ways invented air and sea battle. In an article followed by Project 2049, that targets inside China should be struck; Taiwan should be sold weapons that can do this. (1:25:31)
One was by Dan Blumenthal in 2008. One was by Mark Stokes and Randy Shriver about the need to sell F-22s to Japan, so that the U.S. and Japan, together, can have F-22s. They say in the article, go inside China, and take out time sensitive targets. This, I maintain, goes against the Hidden History of U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations, where such policy moves would be explicitly banned, and it’s up to President Ma Ying-Jeou, if he wants to make public, the restraints that Taiwan is under. Tsai Ying-wen from your party, has also declined to make public these restraints. I would say there is more than 10, some would say more than 20. The president of Taiwan can’t come to Washington D.C., as cabinet secretaries can’t come here. Meetings can’t be, she was asked one time, if she would allow an article to be published, or write one herself, about what are the restraints the Americans have agreed to, what we Taiwan cannot do.
And the answer seems to be, it would embarrass Taiwan to make public all these enormous restraints on us that Washington has… imposed that are not part of any public record. (1:26:55) You can’t go on the internet, and say, give me the list, tell me why President Ma can’t come to Washington D.C. Why can’t American Admirals and Generals visit Taiwan? Where is that in the Communiqué? Where is that in the Taiwan Relations Act? Everybody sort of knows it can’t be done. So, the Hidden History project that Hudson institute is doing, is to try to bring out what really has happened, as though (we are talking to, or) Joe Bosco or Rick Fisher are writing op-ed pieces, they are talking to the next generation or to high-level officials that have never been to Asia. Remember Tony Lake was sent by President Clinton to try to tamp down the crisis of the two carriers, and we asked Tony Lake, how many times have you been to China, we wanted to know how much briefing material you need.
This was the National Security Advisor to the President of the United States in 1996. You know what the answer was? “I’ve never been to China!” (1:27:52) The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, under George W. Bush, was getting ready for his trip to China. I said to Doug Feith who’s here at Hudson as a Senate Director, I said, you know, this is probably your 10th visit to China, isn’t it? I can skip the Beijing is the capital city part of the briefing. He said, Mike, this is my first visit to China. Under Secretary of Defense, in his 50s, highly sophisticated, never been to China. Our government is full of high level policy makers today, who are, for the first time, might understand, basic information about Taiwan and China. So that’s why I keep advertising the book Mayday and the Hidden History of U.S.-China Relations. (1:28:44)
這是1996年，美國總統的國家安全顧問。你知道答案是什麼嗎？“我從來沒有到過中國！”小布希總統的國防部政策的副部長正在為他的中國之旅準備時，我對道格·費思，在哈德森這裡作為參議院的主任說，我說，你知道，這很可能是你第十次訪問中國，是不是？我想我可以在簡介上跳過 “北京就是[中國的]首都” 的部分。他說，邁克，這是我第一次訪問中國。國防部副部長，50多歲，非常富有經驗的，卻從未到過中國。今天，我們的政府所充滿了的高層的決策者，可能第一次明白，台灣和中國的一些基本常識。所以這就是為什麼我一直宣傳這些書，Mayday和美國與中國關係的隱藏的歷史。
Gerrit van der Wees; Editor of Taiwan Communique格里特范德意斯；台灣公報編輯
I have a comment on something that Michael said, and then a question. The comment is, the exchange between Murkowski and Doug Paal. They were not on the same bus. I was on the same bus as Murkowski, and I was sitting next to him and he was getting steamed up about the article, which stated Doug Paal had made some remarks critical of the DPP. The question is, I was really intrigued by your historical perspective and the missed opportunities in the early ‘70s and the late ‘70s. On keeping normal relations with Taiwan, and I think the main significant reason was, as Mark and you (Michael) said, Chiang Kai-shek himself who didn’t want to have anything to do with that. But also, let’s say, the missed opportunities, and lack of wish on the U.S. side. Some people on the U.S., like Bush Senior, was actively advocating for that in the United Nations. But then he was undercut by Kissinger.
And I think Nancy Tucker really had some very fascinating stuff on there. But of course, since then, Taiwan has become a democracy, and has really changed things under its international isolation, wants to be more often equal partner in the international community. So I guess the question is, how, or in what way, could we make this normalization happen? I think Mark referred to it already in some ways. The Ma government wants to go via Beijing, the DPP basically doesn’t want to emphasize that so much. So what would be a good strategy, and that’s all confidential, of course, no press here. Like to have your vision on that. (1:30:49)
Well, the most important first step is to make public the restraints that make our relationship between U.S. and Taiwan abnormal. We’re gonna change to more normal, or better, we have to know what are the restraints in place now. How many of them are there, what is the legal or policy basis for them, and frankly, I think that’s up to Taiwan. I think our system declassifying internal records is very slow. We have some records from WWI, that were recently declassified, almost 100 years-old. The U.S.-China relationship, as you mentioned Nancy [Bernkopf] Tucker’s book, her 2009 book, Cross Strait [Strait Talk]. It is the best book so far…I found her note cards out of the Reagan Library. I was opening up some Reagan Library files. She made a list of almost 100 things she wanted; she was given about 10 of them.
But even that, to use in the book, she also has a chapter about the firing of Therese Shaheen, and the briefing of President George W. Bush, the role of Doug Paal, and why Therese Shaheen was fired. (1:32:05) For those of you who don’t know these inside baseball stuff, she was the Chairman of the AIT, essentially our highest level of person in charge of relations with Taiwan. She has a briefing with President Bush; she tries to explain the difference between don’t support and oppose, and Nancy Tucker found out President Bush said, “I am not a nuance guy.” And ultimately for various reasons, this person gets fired! And the rest of the system sees that happen, oh my God! You start to try to push a little bit on the restraints, and you’ll be fired by the President and the Secretary of State! So that was a pretty big message. I’m only saying, to even debate relations with Taiwan, we’re going to have to get the help of the Taiwan government and political parties to describe what are the restraints the Americans are imposing. And frankly, I visit China a lot. A lot of these restraints the Chinese don’t care that much about. Chinese have a very interesting attitude about U.S.-Taiwan relations.
即使這樣，在書中，她也有一個章節，有關夏馨被開除的事，以及小布希總統的簡單會議、包道格所扮演的角色、為什麼夏馨被解僱的原因。對這些細節內容並不清楚，夏馨她曾是美國在台協會的主席，基本上，就是我們與台灣的關係，最高階級的負責人。她與布希總統的簡單會議上；她試圖解釋「不支持」和「反對」之間的差異。而南希塔克發現，布希總統說， “我不是一個細膩的傢伙。 ”最後由於種種原因，她就被解僱了！而其他人看到這事發生。我的天啊！你企圖推翻制約一點點，你就會被總統和國務卿解僱！所以這是一個相當大的教訓。我的意思是，若要使這個關於台灣關係的辯論公平一點的話，那我們將必須要有台灣的政府和政黨的幫助，來描述美國所強加給台灣的限制是什麼。坦率地說，我常常訪問中國。中國對許多的這些限制其實不很在乎。中國對美台關係有一個非常有趣的態度。
Mark Stokes (1:33:15) 斯托克斯
Just to follow up on this one. If one wanted to think about how to normalize the relations with Taiwan, the first step is to think of the trigger, the actual implementing mechanism which would be, so envision, write a Joint Communique. Joint Communique, regarding the establishment of the relations between the United States and the Republic of China. I say “Republic of China” because that is the name of the country today. So that’s what the first thing would look like. Number two, think long term. Things, people don’t change. It makes patent sense to have normal relations. It’s, admit it, it’s stupid. [It] has been stupid since 1971. Actually, technically, it was stupid not to normalize with the PRC between 1949 and all the way up to 1971. And frankly, the National Community on U.S.-China relations and scholars that testified before the Congress in 1971, I would say, the majority of them, had it right. We can have normal relations with both sides and maintain a, …within our one China policy framework.
And that’s the other thing. A Joint Communique for the establishment for normalization of relations probably will have to…it’s harder to ditch a one China policy than it is to come up with something totally new. And so, whatever it is, will require …within a very liberal perspective on what one China is …and it already exists. The clear statement on our one China policy may, at least in recent years, say it was in 2004, made by Assistant Secretary of State Jim Kelly, in which, I think the question was posed to him was, what is our one China, what is one China. Possibly he says, I don’t know, but what I can tell you what it is not…it is not Beijing’s one China principle, which its one China principle is one country two systems. And so, the …one China policy, in effect, the U.S. doesn’t take positions on outcomes between the two sides. It’s between the two sides to work out themselves. In terms of the United States has a sovereign right to decide on how it relates to other legitimate governments around the world. (Muffled from audience: it doesn’t take a position on sovereignty…) That is true. However, it can have a much better view in terms of, for example, shared sovereignty. Is there something wrong with shared sovereignty?
It makes all the sense in the world. I cannot take positions on the outcome in terms of defining sovereignty put into one China context, but could you have a shared sovereignty solution in which you have normal relations with both sides, it’s equal legitimacy?
On this point, can I add one point? A fourth think tank here, besides AEI and 2049 and Hudson, a fourth think tank, under the leadership of John Tkacik, former State Department, Mandarin-speaking official, had two books published and has some conferences on this topic of normalization, what is one China policy, trying to get into the history of it. Later on, I read a story, in a Taiwan newspaper, that as soon as President Ma Ying-Jeou took over, pressure was brought to bear on Heritage Foundation to fire John Tkacik, to dismiss him from the Heritage Foundation, and John Tkacik has preserved what we call the 禮貌上的沉默—polite silence. But the Taiwan newspaper said that. So, the message there, was even if the Heritage Foundation raises this kind of topic, there will be immediate—not immediate, but within a couple of years—there will be sanctions on the person who does it. So I think the level of intimidation has to be kept in mind that, just having the debate kept alive, is considered in some quarters, to be dangerous. [Seth Cropsey mentions that both Joe Bosco and Rick Fisher are sitting at the back.] 關於這一點，我可不可以再補充一點？這裡的第四個智囊團，除了美國企業研究所、2049、和哈徳孫，第四個智囊團，由前國務院，會說中文的官員，約翰塔希克領導的。他曾出版兩本書，並在一些會議上談過有關正常化、什麼是一個中國的政策的這些問題，並試圖探討這些的歷史。後來，我在台灣的一個報紙上讀了一個故事，說，馬英九總統接任後，傳統基金會就被受到壓力，要他們開除約翰塔希克，把約翰塔希克從傳統基金會辭退掉。約翰塔希克保持了我們所說的「禮貌上的沉默」。但是這是台灣的報紙說的。所以，這個信息是，甚至是美國傳統基金會提出了這樣的話題，也會立即的，不是立即的，但在一兩年內，將會對所提出這話題的人做制裁。所以我覺得必須牢記這恐嚇的程度，因為，僅僅想要讓辯論持續下去也會被某些方面認為是危險的。[賽斯克羅波西提到，喬巴思寇和里克·費舍爾都坐在後面。 ]
Matthew Robertson; Journalist with Epoch Times (1:37:41)
I’ll be very brief…I am just curious about, I mean, this is about security, I mean, the broader definition of security…it seems that potentially, the bigger threat to Taiwan is not just the military one, but the CCP’s political warfare against Taiwan, and its undermining of Taiwan’s institutions or what somebody does that. Does the U.S., do you think, have any role in trying to counter this? Or any role in this issue?
Michael Pillsbury (1:38:15) 白瑞邦博士
This is one sentence answer. I am with Ed Feulner, back in 1979, “We cannot be more Catholic than the Pope,” Feulner went on a second sentence, saying, “We can’t ask for a full loaf, when Taiwan is willing to settle for half-a-loaf.” So you’re raising the question of Taiwan being threatened or being subject to political warfare. It’s really a matter of where Taiwan has to speak up. And they have not. They have not.
這是一個簡單的答案。早在1979年時，我與埃德福伊爾納一起。 他說過，“我們不能比教皇更像天主教徒。”福伊爾納接著第二句，他說：“我們不能要求一整條的麵包，如果台灣政府認為半條就夠了” 。 所以，你提起台灣受到威脅的問題，或受制於政治戰術[的問題]。這都要看台灣自己有沒有意思要出聲。而他們沒有。他們沒有。
Mark Stokes (1:38:44) 斯托克斯
The short answer, in terms of U.S. awareness of Chinese Communist Party political warfare, we published a study on that last year, quite detailed, in terms of understanding the political warfare, is understanding that it’s real, in terms of its structure. Recently, there has been a lot of things in the press about the Joint of Staffs department, the third department, they are China’s equivalent to National Security Agency, NSA. To give you an idea on the scope of political warfare, they have a second level department that is equal in stature, equal in grade to their equivalent of National Security Agency, their equivalent of the Defense Intelligence Agencies.
That is just organizational, to put things into perspective. Arguably, their joint-political department—liaison department—or GPDOD for short (1:39:35) which is equal to their second department, third department, that kind of thing, arguably, has more power, bear in mind, their military intelligence communication system exists in three agencies; second department, which is their DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency], third department, which is their NSA. They view political warfare as not just intelligence, but also influence. Look at their scope—they use platforms that have some distance from them, but…they don’t care that much about hiding it. This platform is one that, for example, China associate internationals from all contact.
They target senior military officers around the world, retired, mostly. They do the retired guys; their regular MND [Ministry of National Defense] does the, in terms of militarial relationships, they do that side of it. And so, it’s not just Taiwan, but it’s every single country in the world. The United States, it happens in Washington, D.C. almost everyday, but there is political warfare, that happens every single day… When the United States got rid of the U.S. Information Agency, after the fall of the Soviet Union, believing that it was over, bear in mind that CCP political warfare structure is set up based on Soviet Union structure, so in the unit they called it active measures, that was KGB service A. In China’s system, same structure, same basic principles, where they define the verb that’s in the vocabulary, define the semantics that you use, and that’s what they do. (1:41:03)
Give another example about how it’s directed toward Taiwan. Taiwan, right now, has five brigades of ballistic missiles directed at it every single day, opposite Taiwan. The political warfare structure is called, it’s a base, just like 52 base of ballistic missiles. There’s a base in FuZhou, that exists in five regiments, that do nothing everyday but barrage Taiwan with propaganda … Propaganda is based on psychological operations. And this isn’t just loose stuff. This is strategic level stuff. They use internet; they control the media outlets that barrage Taiwan every single day. Use Hong Kong, as an example, these third party outlets, Singapore and other places, to be able to set the tone, to be able to set the debate, and be able to manage the perceptions of audiences, both civilians and the military around the world. So…short answer is yes.
… And…Taiwan understands this better than anybody. There is nobody that understands this better than Taiwan. They get it; it’s instinctual there, because they’ve lived under this threat for decades. And it’s instinct to there. …And the U.S.—It’s a bit more difficult to understand that such a thing exist. (1:42:25)
Rick Fisher of Heritage Foundation 傳統基金會的里克·費舍爾
…I just want to give Seth and Misha and the panel a chance to be prescriptive. I think that what we’ve been seeing in the last week in Shanghai is the beginning of a movement toward a Sino-Russian alliance, the likes of which we haven’t seen since the early 1950s, in which, a much more intensive transfer of technology is going to be accompanied by political coincidence, and co-ordination, perhaps even cooperation, as we move out into the next months and years.
I don’t think we have another two years to chase our tails in this town, trying to figure out what to do about this, because, Misha, if…the number of parallel programs between the Russians and the Chinese are alarming enough, from space, to bombers, to aircraft carriers, submarines, when the Russians open the gates again, to the technology to accelerate the Chinese programs, we’re going to have a power projection in Chinese military that’s going to be creating multiple fronts. It’s not just going to be two fronts. You’re up in Asia; there are going to be fronts in Latin America, Africa, other places—the Arctic. My question to the panel is, okay, what do we need to do to get out ahead of this, because, I think the other side of the element of the Taiwan Relations Act that requires us to maintain the capacity to resist, is also a warning to ourselves, that if we don’t maintain that capacity, others are not going in bed with us. Our alliances are going to wean. I’ll stop there. (1:44:39)
Misha Auslan 米沙奧斯蘭
I’ll kick it off briefly. Rick, you have just identified the next years’ worth of work easily for everyone. And so, I don’t have a full answer; I am not even going to try to have a partial answer. …Let me just say one thing: a lot of it is going to depend on the degree to which our partners and allies perceive the threat in the same way that we do, and I would say that, if there is one good potential, it is that Japan has already been steadily moving in the direction where it recognizes that it needs to play a larger role. It wants to play a larger role. There is a lot of constraints on that; there is a lot of disagreements on that.
But it is almost contemporaneous with what’s happening on the Sino Russian front. The release last week of the report on collective self-defense and the new security strategy, I think that, in terms of getting out ahead, it is to take as much advantage of this as we can and move the Japanese into the type of relationship we’ve wanted to have with them, and, again, Michael brought up the question of the hidden history of restrictions of what we actually wanted Japan to do in the region, and I think that it probably goes beyond Taiwan, quite frankly. But, it’s a new world. Now, one of the biggest restraints on us, in order to respond to that, is the fact that Korean and Japan are at the nate [natality?] of their relations.
In fact, what I would worry about, more diagnostically than prescriptively, what I’d be very worried about, is a Chinese, perhaps a Chinese-Russian attempt to hive South Korea off even further from us. And I think we’d have to be very sensitive to that. One thing in our favor is the Obama Administration has a good working relationship with Korea, that has its own set of issues, but I think we need to be very sensitive to anything and try to move them farther away from us. And then, finally, I would just say, I agree with you completely, I am like everyone, I am just starting to look at it all. …What I would say, from a historical perspective, is that, these two, Russia and China, historically, are their own worst enemies in terms of any types of… long term better relations. And as they start to go down that road, I think that it’s going to be, …the negative aspects of it will crop up even more quickly than we anticipated the positive’s coming, and that may limit the degree to which they actually do this.
Rick Fisher 里克·費舍爾
Russians…we are in this war for decades…because we need to …our next generation if the Chinese are after us. How do we exploit those weaknesses today and not let this carry on for decade?
Joe Bosco (1:48:04) 喬巴思寇
I want to thank Mike for the history lesson; fantastic presentations by all of you. In fact, Mike, if you looked at the St. John’s Review a couple of years ago, I did an analysis of the history which may have some relevance to what you were discussing today. (Michael: I have not seen that). Okay. St. John’s Review, two years ago. And I’ve got a piece coming out on history as well. (But the premise of the…,) you make a point, I think, a valid one, that the U.S. policy has been entrenched, in terms of the… orientation approach China is biased, but all of that was premised on the assumption, that engagement, that working with China, that bringing China into the international community would moderate and soften its policies both domestically and in terms of foreign policy.
…It’s clear, over the last few years, that premise has been unfounded, that China has rejected, in fact, Kissinger states in his book on China, that Beijing does not accept international order, which had no part in creating. So, we’ve seen that now in the South China Sea, East China Sea; Beijing rejects the basic premises of the international order. So, given that, one can make the statement that our policy has been a monumental and historical failure, in terms of the entire premise of engagement with China. (1:49:30)
One sentence reply: I really admire Kissinger’s book on China. I thought that the reviews were unfair. They focused on human rights and things he never did, and whether he loves Mao and Zhou Enlai or not. What Kissinger did in that book was he re-thought the original assumptions he and Nixon and Ford had (Joe Bosco: and justify them) Well, but he criticizes himself; he draws on some work done here at Hudson by a guy named Abe Shulsky, that, the Chinese, when provoked, prefer the use of force in a sudden, sharp, psychological, surprise attack. (Joe Bosco?: After years of preparing psychologically to undermine the will of the opponent.)
Yes, yes. They, then, withdraw. They don’t, it’s not like Hitler, occupying territory for they’d been drowned. They then withdraw, and he opens his book, with the story of 1962 in India, then he works in a lot of Chinese warring states, proverbs, an approach that they have and why the use of force against another country, should be, according to China, should be forgiven, it was just a message or a signal to make you kind of sober up. And Kissinger spends a whole chapter on this, and then he says, World War I-style conflict could break out between the U.S. and China. There’s a chapter on that. So this is a very different set of assumptions that Kissinger held back in ’71, ’72. So Kissinger, in many ways, has shown the way, for both the hidden history and to re-think his assumptions. Now, others are to follow, as his example, we’d have accountability, in my view, for those who are wrong
是的，沒錯。他們接著就退出了。他們不像希特勒，佔領領土，然後被淹死 [?] 然後，他們就撤退了，他的書開始於1962年在印度的故事，然後他敘述很多中國的戰國諺語，以及他們應用的方式，和為什麼使用武力對付另一個國家，應該是，根據中國，應該是被原諒的，[因為]這只是一個信息或一個信號，讓你清醒過來。而基辛格花了整整一章在這之上，然後他說，第一次世界大戰風格的衝突可能爆發在美國和中國之間。有一個章節在說這個。所以這是一個跟'71，'72基辛格所設的非常不同的假設。所以，基辛格，在許多方面，有表現出來，無論是隱藏的歷史，或是重新思考自己的假設的方式。現在，別人都跟著，因為他的榜樣，我們會對那些錯誤有義務。
Joe Bosco 巴斯寇
Please read my review of Kissinger’s book in St. John’s Review. Kissinger said two years ago, that Taiwan should make its accommodations with Beijing as quickly as possible, because “China will not wait forever.” Nixon, who was also the real politic-er at that time, changed his view on China and Taiwan, and indicated that the situation has now evolved, Taiwan being a permanent democracy, there is no reason for the U.S. to favor China in that relationship any further. We should have a form of diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Anyway, that gets [to] the question that I was going to ask, which is, what do you think of, you’ve talked about the capabilities of Taiwan in terms of resisting the… China aggression, and Michael talked about the intentions of the U.S. policies referred to Russel’s statement in the Hill, Six Assurances, what is wrong with the U.S. declaring the end of strategic ambiguity, that would be a first step in terms of the normalization of relations, declaring that it is in both our interest, geopolitical interest, and our moral values for us to defend Taiwan against any form of aggression from China.
Michael Pillsbury: Another conference, perhaps? (1:52:48)
Mark Stokes 斯托克斯
The strategic ambiguity in my view, usually has military context. It’s much better off to, the basic idea of getting rid of strategic ambiguity, is best applied at the political level. In other words, be explicit about granting legitimacy to governments on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. That is the best form of getting rid of …that is the ambiguous aspect that really should be done away with, and be much more clearer about having normal relations with both sides. That is the best form. It’s really a political problem. Military is an important part of it, but it’s the political issue that needs to be addressed at the heart of it.
Michael Pillsbury: Are we ready for psychological surprise attack by China?
Mark Stoke: They do it to us every single day.
Michael Pillsbury: If something like that is done to Taiwan?
Mark Stokes: They are already doing it. They’ve done it to us since 1971. …This is their success; they have pulled the wool over our eyes to be able to fool us what the objective reality is. You have two legitimate governments—ROC and PRC. And they have kicked our butt when it comes to political warfare by not having us realize subjective reality.
Seth Cropsey (1:53:57) 克羅波西
I’ve had the chance myself, several years ago to observe close hand, as the director of international broadcasting for the government, our public diplomatic efforts, and some of my remarks, on the questions of our preparedness for responding to and conducting psychological warfare wouldn’t take more than a couple of seconds, and we don’t even have that at this point. So thank you very much for your thoughtful questions and your excellent listening. Thank you panel for your fine presentations. This discussion will indeed be continued. Good afternoon.